Warren Buffet - Annual Meeting Berkshire - 6 May 2023 (3)

Berikut adalah ringkasan Annual Meeting Berkshire Hathaway tahun 2023, bagian 3.

Original source nya ada di > CNBC Buffet Annual Meeting 2023

3. Aside from Bank of America, Berkshire is being cautious on bank stocks

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, Becky?

BECKY QUICK: This question comes from Davis Hans in Houston, Texas. He writes, “What do you think about the business models of the big banks as compared to the regional banks in the wake of the events at Silicon Valley Bank? And how does the perceived implicit guarantee of all deposits at all banks affect big banks and those regional banks?”

 

BECKY QUICK: Pertanyaan ini dari Davis Hans di Houston, Texas. Dia menulis, "Bagaimana menurut anda model bisnis dari bank - bank besar dibandingkan dengan bank - bank regional setelah issue di Bank Sillicon Valley? Dan bagaimana jaminan tersirat untuk semua deposit di semua bank mempengaruhi bank - bank besar dan bank - bank regional?"

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. Well, I can say this. If you follow sound banking methods, which means not doing some things that other people do, a bank can be a perfectly decent investment. And in fact, Charlie and I, well, me originally in 1969, we bought a bank at Berkshire.

And we had $19 million invested in that bank. And we had $17 million I think invested in our insurance companies. And if the Banking Holding Company Act of 1970 hadn’t been passed, we might’ve ended up owning a lot of banks instead of a lot of insurance companies.

We were looking at more banks, and Harry Keefe was taking us around Chicago. And there were other things we could do. And then, bingo, they passed the 1970 Bank Holding Company Act, and we had to divest ourselves of that bank in ten years, which we did —

WARREN BUFFETT: Iya, Well, saya bisa bilang begini. Jika anda mengikuti metode perbankan, yang mana berarti tidak melakukan beberapa hal yang orang lain lakukan, sebuah bank dapat dengan sempurna menjadi sebuah investasi yang bagus. Dan fakta nya, Charlie dan saya, well, saya khususnya pada tahun 1969, kami membeli sebuah bank di Berkshire.

Dan kami berinvestasi 19 juta dollar di bank tersebut. Dan kami punya investasi sebesar 17 juta dollar di perusahaan asuransi. Dan jika Banking Holding Company Act of 1970 tidak dikeluarkan, kami mungkin akhirnya akan punya lebih banyak perusahaan perbankan dibandingkan dengan perusahaan asuransi.

Kami melihat ke banyak bank, dan Harry Keefe mengantar kami mengelilingi Chicago. Dan ada hal yang dapat kami lakukan. Dan kemudian, bingo, mereka mengeluarkan Banking Holding Company Act of 1970 , dan kami harus mendivestasi perusahaan perbankan tersebut dalam 10 tahun, yang mana kami lakukan - 

CHARLIE MUNGER: By the way, it never had a bad debt.

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh, it —

CHARLIE MUNGER: It never had an unnecessary cost. It made nothing but money with no risk. It never presented any deposit insurance risk to the government.

WARREN BUFFETT: Zero.

CHARLIE MUNGER: Ngomong - ngomong, perusahaan perbankan tersebut tidak pernah punya hutang.

WARREN BUFFETT : Oh, itu - 

CHARLIE MUNGER: Bank tersebut tidak pernah punya biaya yang tidak diperlukan. Bank tersebut menghasilkan uang tanpa resiko. Bank tersebut tidak pernah memberikan resiko deposit ke pemerintah.

WARREN BUFFETT : Nol.

CHARLIE MUNGER: It was a lovely, sound, constructive institution in this community. And any person who went in and deserved credit could get credit.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, and we were going to buy more banks.

CHARLIE MUNGER: And we were forced out of it.

CHARLIE MUNGER : Perusahaan tersebut sangat bagus, aman, institusi nya juga sangat membangun di komunitas nya. Dan semua orang yang pergi dan meminta kredit dan pantas mendapatkan nya, akan mendapatkan nya.

WARREN BUFFETT : Iya, dan kami akan membeli banyak bank - bank lain

CHARLIE MUNGER : Dan kami dipaksa untuk keluar dari situ.

WARREN BUFFETT: We were going to buy more banks. And if we bought more banks, we probably wouldn’t have expanded the insurance business. But, you know, the law changed and so we divested, and we’ve done OK in insurance. But banking was more attractive to us. It was bigger and there were more targets to buy.

And you could run a perfectly sound bank then, and no negotiable certificates of deposit. All these things, all the inventions that came later, and you could still run them today and you could earn good money. Very good money. And we would’ve found more banks. But we’re precluded from doing that.

WARREN BUFFET: Kami akan membeli lebih banyak bank. Dan jika kami membeli lebih banyak bank, kami mungkin tidak akan melebarkan bisnis asuransi kami. Tapi, anda tahu, hukum nya berubah, dan kami harus menjualnya, dan kami cukup berhasil di asuransi. Tapi perbankan sangat menarik untuk kami. Sektor tersebut lebih besar, dan banyak perusahaan yang bisa dibeli.

Dan anda dapat menjalankan perusahaan perbankan dengan sangat aman dulu, dan tidak ada deposit yang dapat di negosiasikan. Dan dari semua hal tersebut, terdapat penemuan - penemuan baru yang muncul belakangan, dan anda tetap dapat menjalankan nya hari ini, dan anda tetap akan menghasilkan jumlah uang yang bagus. Jumlah uang yang sangat bagus. Dan kami telah menemukan lebih banyak bank. Tapi kami dihalangi untuk melakukan hal tersebut.

And we’ve sold banks, bank stocks in the last, well, we sold them first when the pandemic broke out, and then we sold some more in the last six months. And we don’t know where the shareholders of the big banks, necessarily, or the regional banks or any bank, are heading now.

I’ve got my own personal money, and I’m probably above the FDIC limit, and I’ve got it with a local bank. And I think, I don’t worry about it in the least. But in terms of owning banks, events will determine their future. And you’ve got politicians involved.

Dan kami menjual bank bank kami, dan saham bank pada akhirnya, well, kami menjual nya lebih dahulu ketika pandemi dimulai, dan kami menjual beberapa lain nya dalam enam bulan terakhir. Dan kami tidak tahu dimana pemegang saham bank bank besar, seharusnya, atau bank - bank regional atau bank manapun, kemana menuju nya saat ini.

Saya punya uang pribadi, dan mungkin saya di atas limit FDIC, dan saya memulainya dengan bank lokal. Dan saya pikir, saya tidak perlu khawatir tentang hal tersebut setidaknya. Tapi dalam hal memiliki bank, bahkan mereka akan menentukan masa depan mereka. Dan ada politisi yang juga akan ikut.

You’ve got a whole lot of people who don’t really understand how the system works. And I would say you’ve had something less than a perfect communication between various people and the American public. So, the American public is probably as confused about banking as ever.

And that has consequences. And nobody knows what the consequences are because every event starts recreating a different dynamic. I mean, in physics you know that pie is going to be 3.14, you know, infinite number of numbers after that, but no matter what happens.

But you don’t know what has happened to the stickiness of deposits at all. It got changed by 2008. It’s gotten changed by this. And that changes everything. And so, we’re very cautious in a situation like that about ownership of banks. And we do remain with one bank holding, a deal, but we originated that deal with the Bank of America.

And I like Bank of America. I like the management. And I proposed the deal with them, so I stick with it. But do I know how to project out what’s going to happen from here? The answer is I don’t, because I’ve seen so many things in the last few months which really weren’t that unexpected to me to see.

But which reconfirmed my beliefs that the American public doesn’t understand our banking system, and some people in Congress perhaps don’t understand it any more than I don’t understand why the spaceships go up. I mean, there’s all kinds of things I don’t know about. But if you’re in Congress, you have to take a position on everything. And sometimes it’s to your advantage if you really understand it not to say exactly what you feel. And here we are. Charlie?

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, a lot has happened in banking in my lifetime. I welcomed all that early banking of the deserving immigrants by the early Bank of America. And I think all the credit cards when they came in as original bank cards were a great contribution to civilization.

CHARLIE MUNGER: And but the gamier it gets and the more it looks like investment banking, the less I like it, as a citizen. I don’t want, I am always, I am deeply distrustful of situations in which everybody wants to get rich and envies everybody else. I regard that atmosphere as utterly toxic.

And to people who like one story, which this is, again, a true story, and I’m not naming the name, and it wasn’t Pete Jefferies, because he might fit this name, but it wasn’t Pete. But our hero, Gene Abegg, was going to have to retire at some point.

And so, we hired a future replacement. This is kind of a little bit of the problem I talked before, about having the perfect business, and now we’re going to bring in somebody. We actually bring in somebody who went to Central High with Charlie, although —

CHARLIE MUNGER: My class.

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah. (LAUGH) And Charlie didn’t know I was picking out this guy. He wasn’t —

CHARLIE MUNGER: If he’d have asked me, we wouldn’t have hired him. (LAUGHTER)

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, if I asked you, I probably wouldn’t have hired anybody, but that’s another question. But this guy comes over, and perfectly decent guy, but presentable, you know, looks like a banker and everything. And, of course, the first thing he wants to do, we’ve got this wonderful bank, but we’ve got the crummiest looking building in Rockford.

And we don’t need a great building, we just need a great banker. And naturally this guy wants to build a new building. And because we were the most profitable bank, but we didn’t look like we were the most profitable (LAUGH) bank. So, I told him he could have any building he wanted, as long as it was not higher than, it had to be shorter than our nearest competitor.

And he lost interest totally. (LAUGH) He wanted to be on the top floor of the biggest building in town, and I told him he could horizontally do anything he wanted but he couldn’t do it vertically. And it taught me a lot about the guy’s motivations in life. But — and he didn’t end up running the bank anyway. Anyway, that’s all I know about banking and probably more.